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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2001 at 8:46:40 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 
crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York 
City.
1
  Sixteen minutes and thirty-one seconds later, United Airlines Flight 
175 struck the South Tower, killing all on board and an unknown number 
of people in the tower.
2
  Approximately fifty-one minutes six seconds after 
the second plane hit, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon 
travelling at 530 miles per hour.
3
  All on board, including many military 
personnel in the Pentagon, were killed.
4
  In a fourth plane, United Flight 
93, passengers were aware their plane had just been hijacked and took a 
vote to retake the plane to save their lives.
5
  Calls with family members 
ended as the cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of passengers 
trying to break through the cockpit door.
6
  Family members reported they 
                                                          
 1.  NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, XV (2004) (summarizing investigatory findings 
from the 9/11 attacks, including over 1,200 interviews and 2.5 million pages of 
documents).  
 2.  See id. at 8 (evincing flight contained 56 passengers according to the flight 
manifest). 
 3.  See id. at 9-10 (noting that Barbara Olson, wife of then Solicitor General Ted 
Olson, was aboard Flight 77 and reported to her husband via phone that the plane had 
been hijacked sometime between 9:16 A.M. and 9:26 A.M.). 
 4.  See id. at 9 (stating that the Secret Service was notified at 9:34 A.M. that an 
unknown aircraft was heading towards the Pentagon). 
 5.  See id. at 13 (citing five calls to family members on the ground of passengers’ 
intent to revolt against the hijackers). 
 6.  See id. at 14 (2004) (emphasizing the sound of breaking glass, loud thumps, 
crashes, and shouts). 
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could hear the voices of their loved ones on Flight 93 fighting among the 
din.
7
  Shortly after 10:02:23 A.M., a hijacker can be heard saying, “Pull it 
down! Pull it down.”
8
  The sound of passengers fighting to regain the plane 
is audible until the aircraft plows into an empty field at 580 miles per hour.
9
 
Hours after the collapse of the Twin Towers, the idea that the September 
11th (“9/11”) attacks had “changed everything” permeated American 
popular and political discussion.
10
  According to President George W. 
Bush, the attacks on September 11th were the beginning of a “new kind of 
war” and justified the hegemony of the United States as a global police 
power.
11
  The Bush administration also argued that because the 
circumstances were new, the policies that addressed terrorist attacks like 
9/11 should be new as well.
12
  Like many tragedies, the events of 9/11 
became a rhetorical bookend, marking the end of business as usual and the 




Courts began to question whether a new kind of war also justified a new 
legal regime.
14
  Families of the 9/11 victims turned to the judiciary for 
judgment and restitution from those they held responsible.
15
  Although Al-
Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden took credit for the attacks, suspicion also fell 
on Saudi Arabia when it was discovered that fifteen of the nineteen 
hijackers were Saudi citizens.
16
  Families of 9/11 victims alleged that the 
                                                          
 7.  See id. at 13-14 (reporting that the hijackers responded to this attack by rolling 
the plane and knocking the passengers off balance). 
 8.  See id. at 14 (reporting that the hijackers were recorded yelling, “praise for 
Allah”). 
 9.  See id. (noting that the passengers’ attempts to retake the plane prevented the 
hijacker’s from reaching the White House, their original target). 
 10.  See MARILYN B. YOUNG ET AL., SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED 
MOMENT? 2 (Mary L. Dudziak, ed., 2003) (arguing that 9/11 became a pretext for 
justifying absolute sovereignty for the United States and limiting sovereignty for 
others). 
 11.  See id. at 3 (positing that some saw Bush’s characterization of war as 
justifying a softening of constitutional restraints). 
 12.  See id. (noting similar arguments followed World War I and World War II 
arguing for softening of constitutional restraints regarding tactics to fight communism). 
 13.  See id. at 3-4 (suggesting that while the theory that 9/11 changed the world 
may be debatable, the attack did enable policies that otherwise would have appeared 
overly aggressive). 
 14.  See id. at 7 (arguing that after 9/11 courts were faced with how the law should 
respond to times of crises). 
 15.  See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 665 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(comprising one of the three cases that became known the Terrorist Attacks Litigation). 
 16.  See Julian Hattem, Congress Publishes Redacted 28 Pages From 9/11 Report, 
THE HILL (July 15, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://bit.ly/29ClRYj (reporting the Saudi 
3
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Saudi royal family, banks, and charitable organizations provided financial 
support to the Al-Qaeda hijackers through donations to extremist mosques 
that promoted jihad.
17
  Many of these theories arose from a 2002 report by 
the House and Senate intelligence committees that suggested Saudi 
involvement, which became known as the “28 pages.”
18
  However, an 
independent Congressional commission found no evidence that Saudi 
government or Saudi officials funded the attacks.
19
 
In July of 2016, the “28 pages” were released, reigniting public interest 
in establishing a connection between Saudi Arabia and the events of 9/11.
20
  
Against this backdrop, Senator Chuck Schumer of New York and Senator 
John Cornyn of Texas proposed the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism 
Act (JASTA).
21
  JASTA was framed as a vehicle to hold accountable the 
state sponsors of terrorism who had previously escaped liability through 
“errors” in the U.S. legal system.
22
  By “errors,” drafters meant the 
immunities afforded to Saudi Arabia under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Antiterrorism Act’s (ATA) condition that 
litigants prove Saudi Arabia was the primary cause of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.
23
  Although JASTA was framed narrowly as a means for 9/11 
victims to hold Saudi Arabia liable under new rules, it amends 
longstanding principles of sovereign immunity and relations between 
                                                          
citizenship of fifteen of the hijackers fueled suspicions that inflamed U.S.- Saudi 
relations). 
 17.  See Rowan Scarborough, Saudi Government Funded Extremism in U.S. 
Mosques and Charities: Report, WASH. TIMES (July 19, 2016), http://bit.ly/29TPDcf 
(emphasizing that follow-up investigations were unable to confirm the Saudi kingdom 
or its agents helped or knowingly financed the attack). 
 18.  See 28 Pages of the 2002 Congressional Inquiry Into the Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 15, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2goFQjZ (discussing possible Saudi involvement 
in the attacks). 
 19.  See Editorial, The Risks of Suing the Saudis for 9/11, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 
2016), http://nyti.ms/2eP9TAL (questioning the value of suing the Saudis without 
causal evidence linking them to 9/11). 
 20.  See Hattem, supra note 16 (characterizing the 28 pages as a political foil 
containing only coincidental connections between the Saudis and the 9/11 hijackers). 
 21.  See H.R. 3143, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing the early framework of JASTA 
that would become Public Law No: 114-222).  
 22.  See Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, “Justice Against Sponsors of 
Terrorism Act” – Legislation, Long Sought By 9/11 Families, Will Allow Victims of 
9/11 & Other Terrorist Attacks to Foreign Countries & Others that Funded Al-Qaeda, 
Isis (Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Press Release] (arguing the Act will correct 
“egregious errors” within the courts by circumnavigating the immunities afforded to 
Saudi Arabia under the FSIA). 
 23.  See id. (stating JASTA allows victims “like the September 11
th
 victims” to 
pursue foreign states that funded the attacks). 
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states.
24
  Additionally, it allows private litigants to sue foreign states for a 
terrorism claim, leapfrogging the executive’s foreign policy prerogative 




This comment argues that JASTA’s intended purpose to provide 
“justice” to victims of terrorism, though publically popular, fails to protect 
U.S. citizens in the broader context of national interests.
26
  Further, JASTA 
violates principles of sovereign immunity, and interferes with the 




Part II will highlight the importance of sovereign immunity, its history, 
and how the FSIA, ATA, and JASTA interact with the doctrine.
28
  Part III 
will argue that JASTA cannot legally accomplish what it intends to do.
29
  It 
will also show that the executive’s claim settlement power is not precluded 
by JASTA in practice or in fact, but it places the executive at odds with 
Congress, and undermines the executive’s ability to effectively manage 
foreign policy.
30
  Part IV will advocate that Congress repeal JASTA and 
consider a soft-power diplomatic approach that promotes collaboration 
with other states to combat terrorism.
31
  Finally, Part V will conclude that 
                                                          
 24.  See Chet Nagle, Opinion, JASTA: The Anti-Saudi Law Will Hurt Us, Not 
Them, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 26, 2016), http://bit.ly/2gypEJz (reporting the Dutch 
Parliament’s characterization of JASTA as a “gross and unwarranted breach of Dutch 
sovereignty” and Sheikh Jamal Al-Shari’s promise to sue the U.S. government in Iraq 
should JASTA become law).  
 25.  See Veto Message from the President – S.2040, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 23, 
2016), http://bit.ly/2cZh99D [hereinafter Veto Message] (noting JASTA takes foreign 
policy matters from professionals and gives them to private litigants and courts). 
 26.  See Amir Taheri, JASTA: Misconceived and Stillborn, Can it Survive?, 
ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (Oct. 5, 2016), http://bit.ly/2g4S14Q (describing JASTA as 
“politically cost-free for Congress to send a signal” about being tough on terrorism).  
 27.  See U.S. Const. art. II; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (concluding the President of the United States had “plenary” 
powers in the foreign affairs field that are not dependent upon congressional 
delegation).  
 28.  See infra Part II (examining the principle of sovereign immunity and how the 
FSIA, ATA, and JASTA have curtailed its protections in the United States). 
 29.  See infra Part III (arguing that JASTA, as drafted, is legally ineffective). 
 30.  See Dames and Moore v. Regan 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (upholding the 
executive’s intervention into federal court litigation against Iran through President 
Carter’s executive claims settlement power to negotiate the return of American 
hostages); see also Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 866-67 (2009) (upholding 
President Bush’s veto of a legislative act barring immunity for Iraq on the basis that it 
would destabilize Iraq and principles of sovereign immunity).  
 31.  See infra Part IV (advocating that JASTA be repealed because it violates 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Tracing the History of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine  
Historically, the United States afforded foreign states and governments 
complete or “absolute” immunity from suit in domestic courts.
33
  This was 
considered the basic law of nations, and was grounded in recognition of the 
“perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns.”
34
  In the early 
part of the 20th Century, the Supreme Court made clear that if the 
Executive Branch expressed its views regarding whether immunity should 
be granted, courts were bound to accept those views.
35
  Courts thus looked 
to the political branches for guidance in determining whether to exercise 
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.
36 
As states began engaging in commercial activities around the turn of the 
century, the idea of blanket immunity began to erode in customary 
international law.
37
  In response, the U.S. shifted to a “restrictive” approach 
to sovereign immunity around 1952.
38
  The restrictive approach 
distinguishes between public acts (jus imperii) of a foreign state, for which 
immunity is generally accorded, and private acts (jure gestionis) for which 
                                                          
international law and reduces the likelihood of collaboratively fighting terrorism).  
 32.  See infra Part V (concluding that JASTA is legally feeble because it does not 
fully address the legal barriers of the FSIA or the ATA and sets dangerous foreign 
policy precedent). 
 33.  See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (holding that 
sovereigns possess equal rights and equal independence, and thus jurisdictions should 
be mutually relaxed  
over one sovereign in another territory). 
 34.  See id. at 137 (suggesting that to haul a foreign sovereign into court would be a 
serious affront to its sovereignty). 
 35.  See Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1943) (stating that if the executive 
announced a policy of immunity then this policy was binding on the courts); see also 
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (holding that it is not for the courts to deny 
an immunity which the government sees fit to allow).  
 36.  See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35 (reiterating issues of foreign policy, such as 
immunity, generally fall within the executive rather than the legislature or judiciary). 
 37.  See BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 538-40 (6th 
ed. 2011) (citing to the Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate’s so-called “Tate Letter” 
contending that international trade and greater contact between states justified this 
distinction).  
 38.  See id. (arguing customary international law had shifted to distinguish between 
sovereign acts and commercial acts). 
6
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immunity is generally not available.
39
  The “restrictive theory” narrowed 
the applicability of sovereign immunity, and initiated a judicial process to 
determine whether a claim against a foreign state involved a public or 
private act.
40
  In practice, however, courts continued to reject jurisdiction 
that could potentially disrupt foreign relations.
41
  This proved problematic 
when immunity was not consistently or predictably applied.
42
 The Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act was drafted to codify the sole means for a U.S. 
court to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state.
43
 
1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) 
Under the FSIA, foreign states are immune from jurisdiction of all U.S. 
courts unless one of the FSIA exceptions to general immunity applies.
44
  
Courts first consider whether the defendant is a “foreign state,” as that 
concept is defined under the FSIA.
45
  If the action does fall into an 
enumerated exception and the defendant is determined to be a state, federal 
courts have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
46
  In 2008, 
Congress expanded the FSIA’s exceptions through the “terrorism 
exception.”
47
  The terrorism exception applies only when the foreign state 
is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of (or as a result of) 
the act in question.
48
  The provision also requires that the claimant or 
victim be a U.S. citizen or an official or employee of the U.S. military at 
                                                          
 39.  See id. at 539 (advising that a trend toward a restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity is supported by the majority of states).  
 40.  See id. at 540 (noting that this determination will either trigger or bar the 
defense of sovereign immunity). 
 41.  See e.g., Loomis v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 941, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (refusing to 
permit the attachment of a fund which contained proceeds from the sale of oil owned 
by Italy, despite having no formal suggestion of immunity from the State Department). 
 42.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6604, 6605, 6610 (indicating that the FSIA was meant to be the exclusive standard for 
resolving questions of sovereign immunity).  
 43.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976) (making courts responsible for deciding 
issues of immunity). 
 44.  See id. (reflecting the purpose of the Act to generally afford immunity unless 
specific exceptions can be established).   
 45.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976) (defining “foreign state” to include not only the 
state itself, but also a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the state).  
 46.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976) (noting that this process would either trigger or 
bar the defense of sovereign immunity). 
 47.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008) (covering both acts of terrorism by a foreign 
state and providing material support for terrorism). 
 48.  See id. (applying to Iran, Syria, and Sudan as of 2016).  
7
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the time of the claim.
49
  If these elements are met, a court can exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign state.
50
 
In addition to providing a framework for what kind of suits can be 
brought against foreign states, the FSIA also provides broad immunities 
over the attachment of a foreign state’s assets.
51
  If a judgment is entered 
against a foreign state, courts must independently consider the extent to 




  This secondary analysis of immunity for the attachment of 
assets hints at the legislatures’ awareness at the time of the FSIA’s 
codification that seizing a foreign state’s assets could seriously disrupt 
comity between states and should only occur under narrow circumstances.
53
  
Recent case law reflects a similar hesitation by courts to exercise 
jurisdiction, particularly where the Executive Branch has advised that 
doing so would harm U.S. interests.
54
  In 2004 the Supreme Court indicated 
that the State Department’s views concerning the exercise of jurisdiction 
over particular defendants might be entitled to deference.
55
  The Court 
similarly ruled in a series of cases pertaining to sovereign immunity, 
suggesting that deference to the Executive Branch in cases that impact 
foreign policy still informs the Court’s jurisprudence.
56
 
2. The Antiterrorism Act (“ATA”) 
The ATA establishes a civil remedy for victims of international terrorism 
                                                          
 49.  See id. (including in addition to U.S. nationals, members of the armed forces, 
government employees, and contractors).  
 50.  See id. (assuming the claimant has standing).  
 51.  See 28 U.S.C. at §§ 1610, 1611 (1976) (noting the FSIA provides narrower 
exceptions to immunity for the attachment and execution of assets than for sovereigns). 
 52.  See id. (providing that a foreign state is entitled to a secondary analysis of 
whether its assets may be attached even when a state fails to appear).  
 53.  See Praven Banker Assocs. Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854-
56 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting the narrower exceptions to immunity for the attachment of 
assets allows courts to exercise more discretion preserving diplomatic relations).  
 54.  See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689, 701-02 (2004) 
(highlighting that while the FSIA’s framework always applies, the executive’s views 
merit great deference).  
 55.  See id. at 696 (holding immunity reflects the current political realities and 
relationships and is a gesture of comity).  
 56.  See American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (discussing 
the President’s “vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our [U.S.] foreign 
relations”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (relying on 
the holding of Altmann as an indication that federal courts should give serious weight 
to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy). 
8
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and criminalizes harboring and providing material support for terrorists.
57
  
The ATA’s focus on cutting off “material support” for terrorism suggests 
that it aims not only to compensate victims for their injuries but also to cut 
off vital sources of terrorist funding.
58
  To that end, section 2333(a) 
provides treble damages to successful plaintiffs.
59
 
Although the statute expressly empowers U.S. nationals to file a private 
cause of action, exactly who an individual may sue is ambiguous.
60  Rather 
than define the liable actor, section 2331(1) focuses on the nature of the 
act.
61
  As a result, victims of terrorist attacks have attempted to hold banks, 
corporations, and countries liable for terrorist acts under the ATA.
62
  Such 
cases have succeeded on some occasions, mostly where the defendant was 
a state sponsor of terrorism.
63  In practice, the Act’s ambiguous language 
has also opened the door for plaintiffs to sue on a basis of secondary 
liability for acts of international terrorism.
64
 
Whether the ATA allows for claims under secondary liability is a point 
of contention.
65
  In Rothstein v. USB AG, the Second Circuit held that the 
ATA does not support civil aiding-and-abetting liability.
66
  The Court 
reasoned that, because section 2333 does not speak to aiding-and-abetting 
liability, congressional intent to impose such liability should not be 
                                                          
 57.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2338 (1990) (providing civil remedies for American 
victims of international terrorism).   
 58.  See, e.g., Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 55-57 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(looking to the legislature describing the ATA as a “tool in the arsenal” against fighting 
terrorist states).  
 59.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012) (ensuring punitive damages are awarded by 
requiring treble damages and attorney’s fees).  
 60.  See id. (providing any U.S. national may sue but failing to describe who may 
be sued, thus leaving the action open ended).  
 61.  See id. at § 2331(1) (defining “international terrorism” in the act’s definition 
section and its elements but not the actor against whom a suit can be brought).   
 62.  See Steve Vladeck, The 9/11 Civil Litigation and the Justice Against Sponsors 
of Terrorism Act (JASTA), JUST SEC. (Apr. 18, 2016, 8:02 AM), http://bit.ly/2goCAVB 
[hereinafter Vladeck, 9/11 Litigation] (outlining how litigants have capitalized on the 
lack of clarity in the ATA to hold banks liable that fund terrorism).   
 63.  See Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32–37 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding damages to 
plaintiffs suing Iran).  
 64.  See Anti-Terrorism Act Liability for Financial Institutions, SULLIVAN & 
CROMWELL LLP, 1 (Sept. 24, 2014), http://bit.ly/2g4XJnd (noting the surge in cases 
brought against banks in the last decade).  
 65.  See id. at 4 (noting disagreement between the Second Circuit and other courts 
over secondary liability within the ATA).  
 66.  708 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiff’s chain of inferences 
was too far attenuated to show proximate cause).  
9
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However, the Seventh Circuit interpreted a more expansive holding 
in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development, characterizing 
aiding-and-abetting as “primary liability . . . [with] the character of 
secondary liability.”
68
  Under this view, to be liable for terrorism an actor 
providing material support must know the money will be used in 
preparation for or in carrying out the tortious act on an American citizen 
abroad.
69
  In other words, to establish liability, the plaintiff must prove 
intentional misconduct of a bank or other entity.
70
  These decisions have 
made it difficult for plaintiffs to use the ATA as a means to hold Saudi 
Arabia civilly liable for the 9/11 attacks.
71
 
3.  Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act 
The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) was designed 
to change U.S. law pertaining to foreign sovereign immunity and make it 
easier for the 9/11 victims to sue the government of Saudi Arabia and 
foreign financial institutions suspected of providing material support to the 
9/11 hijackers.
72
  JASTA proposed to amend the FSIA and ATA so courts 
would not dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction or failing to 
show primary liability.
73
  Although much of what JASTA purported to do 
has been excised through subsequent revisions, the act does amend the 
ATA to allow aiding-and-abetting liability for acts of terrorism committed, 
planned, or organized by an organization designated as a foreign terrorist 
organization (FTO).
74
  Additionally, it creates a cause of action against 
                                                          
 67.  See Anti-Terrorism Act Liability for Financial Institutions, supra note 64 at 3 
(discussing how the Rothstein holding will require proximate cause). 
 68.  See Vladeck, 9/11 Litigation, supra note 62 (summarizing the Court’s analysis 
in Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)).  
 69.  See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 
2008) (holding that giving money to a terrorist organization is not intentional 
misconduct unless one either knows or is indifferent to this knowledge).  
 70.  See id. (arguing that when the facts known of an organization show a high 
probability that it is engaging in terrorism, a person cannot plead ignorance to this 
risk).  
 71.  See Vladeck, 9/11 Litigation, supra note 62 (summarizing the legal history of 
9/11 litigants’ attempts to hold Saudi Arabia liable for the attacks).  
 72.  See id. (summarizing the legislative intent behind JASTA as a means to 
counter the existing sovereign immunity framework, particularly for 9/11 plaintiffs).  
 73.  See Press Release, supra note 22 (advocating for JASTA to correct the 
“egregious” errors of the ATA and FSIA and create a cause of action that will allow 
families to “take their attackers” to court).  
 74.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of State to designate an 
organization as an FTO if the Secretary finds that it is a) foreign and b) engaged in 
10
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foreign states for injury arising from an act of international terrorism, 
regardless of where the act occurred.
75
 JASTA retains, however, immunity 
for claims falling under the FSIA for foreign sovereigns.
76
 
In contrast to its legislative purpose, JASTA is relatively limited as a 
result of significant amendments to the bill that excised additional bars to 
immunity.
77
  However, its existing provisions significantly undermine long-
standing principles of sovereign immunity, which are integral to 
international law and comity between states.
78
  Moreover, its passage 





III.  ANALYSIS 
A. JASTA is Imprudent Law Because It Cannot Meaningfully Alter 
Victims of Terrorism Chances for Reparation, Yet Opens the Door 
for Litigation that Undermines American Counter-Terrorism 
Policy. 
1.  JASTA Does Not Overturn Prior Judicial Decisions That Rejected 
Personal Jurisdiction Over Past Defendants in 9/11 Litigation Nor 
Significantly Changes Modes of Liability Under the ATA. 
JASTA’s amendments to the ATA and the FSIA broadly change 
principles of sovereign immunity, which affects the law of nations while 
achieving little for the limited class of people the Act intends to serve.
80
  
                                                          
terrorist activity as defined in § 1182(a)(3)(B)).  
 75.  See JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 4(b), 130 Stat. 852, 854  (2016) 
(amending the FSIA to include 28 U.S.C. § 1605B, or “JASTA claims”). 
 76.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2) (1992) (barring suits against foreign states or agents 
acting under color of law). 
 77.  See Steve Vladeck, The Senate Killed JASTA, Then Passed It. . ., JUST SEC. 
(May 18, 2016), http://bit.ly/2f93jk8 [hereinafter Vladeck, JASTA] (arguing that 
redrafting JASTA largely denuded it of its legal effect).  
 78.  See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on S. 2040 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
114th Cong. 64 (2016) (statement of Paul B. Stephan, Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia Law School) [hereinafter Stephan Statement] (stating JASTA derogates from 
international law principles of sovereign immunity that are viewed as illegal 
internationally).   
 79.  See id. (noting JASTA has caused furor even from U.S. allies).  
 80.  See id. (arguing that while the version of JASTA passed in the House and 
Senate largely denudes the original bill, it still undermines international law). 
11
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For many 9/11 plaintiffs, it has no legal effect at all.
81
  As initially drafted, 
JASTA would have amended the ATA to expressly allow personal 
jurisdiction over any individual for acts of international terrorism in which 
a U.S. citizen “suffers injury in his or her person, property, or business.”
82
  
This would have lessened the burden for plaintiffs who were required to 
show a foreign state has sufficient minimum contacts for personal 
jurisdiction by proving the state aimed its tortious conduct at the United 
States.
83




Excising per se jurisdiction is crucially significant for those JASTA 
purports to serve because U.S. courts have already dismissed several suits 
against Saudi officials for lack of personal jurisdiction.
85
  By maintaining 
the ATA’s silence over personal jurisdiction, litigants have no new means 
to reopen lawsuits that were dismissed for failing to prove sufficient 
contacts between foreign defendants and the plaintiff.
86
  For many litigants, 
this frustrates JASTA’s aim of amending “bad decisions” and offering 




Two other proposed amendments to the ATA similarly fall short of 
JASTA’s legally improper aims of changing existing law.
88
  First, as 
initially proposed, JASTA sought to amend the ATA by repealing the 
prohibition on suits against a foreign state, agency, or official acting under 
                                                          
 81.  See id. (noting that without the personal jurisdiction provision, JASTA will not 
overrule prior judicial decisions that dismissed 9/11 victim’s civil suits).  
 82.  Compare H.R. 3143, 113th Cong. (2013) (giving personal jurisdiction in U.S. 
courts for any claims in accordance with § 2333), with JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 
(excising de facto jurisdiction from the Act thereby preserving prior judicial decisions 
that blocked jurisdiction). 
 83.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that a 
defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with a place to establish personal 
jurisdiction).  
 84.  See JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 4(a), 130 Stat. 852, 854 (2016) (preserving 
the court’s analysis under the ATA of whether personal jurisdiction exists).  
 85.  See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 
575-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting defendant’s Prince Naif’s motion to dismiss, and 
noting the issue of personal jurisdiction was “relatively straightforward”).  
 86.  See JASTA § 4(a) (creating no new basis for 9/11 litigants to challenge 
previous rulings).  
 87.  See id. § 2 (stating JASTA would rectify the Second Circuit “improperly 
blocked” terrorism-related claims by requiring an unfair strict proximate causation 
test).  
 88.  See id. § 4(a) (excluding the language from sections five and six of H.R. 3143, 
113th Cong. (2013)). 
12
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color of legal authority.
89
  Second, it would have amended the ATA to 
allow aiding-and-abetting liability in cases arising from an act of terrorism 
“committed, planned, or authorized” by a state designated as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization (FTO).
90
  Because the ATA does not explicitly 
specify against whom liability may be pursued, this amendment would 
have clarified allowable modes of liability against sovereigns.
91
  Further, 
the proposed change to the ATA would have overruled the Second 
Circuit’s ruling limiting ATA claims where defendants are not directly 
responsible for the underlying act of terrorism.
92
 
As proposed, JASTA retains 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2), which prohibits ATA 
claims against “a foreign state,” such as Saudi Arabia.
93
  Further, under 
section 4(a), JASTA makes it more difficult to hold foreign sovereigns 
liable under an aiding-and-abetting theory by limiting its application in a 
manner that excludes liable sovereigns.
94
  Section 4(a) extends liability for 
“any injury arising from an act of international terrorism, committed, 
planned, or authorized by” an FTO to any person who knowingly aids and 
abets—provides substantial assistance.
95
  A definition section follows this, 
stipulating that courts interpret “person” using the definition in U.S.C. Title 
1 § 1, which does not include sovereigns.
96
  Operationally, this excludes 




However, JASTA would strip immunity for sovereigns for acts that fall 
within section 1605B, which creates “JASTA claims” (i.e. claims against a 
foreign state for physical injury or death caused by a terrorist act) 
regardless of where the tortious act occurred.
98
  Nonetheless, JASTA 
                                                          
 89.  See H.R. 3143, 113th Cong. § 6 (2013) (proposing to remove § 2337 of the 
ATA that bars suits against foreign sovereigns). 
 90.  See id. § 4 (proposing to amend § 2333 of the ATA).  
 91.  See JASTA § 4(a) (allowing for secondary liability in some instances).  
 92.  See Rothstein v. USB AG, 708 F.3d 82, 88, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2013) (creating 
binding authority on all cases in the Second Circuit that bars ATA cases pursuing 
secondary liability).  
 93.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2) (1992) (barring suits against foreign heads of state 
and government officials acting under color of law).  
 94.  See JASTA § 4(a) (diminishing JASTA’s usefulness to 9/11 litigants).  
 95.  See id. (implying that the definitional inclusion effectively closes the door on a 
broader interpretation of “persons” that could have included foreign sovereigns).  
 96.  See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “person” to include corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, joint stock companies, and individuals).  
 97.  See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 4(a) (hinting that legislators may have been 
uneasy with allowing a private cause of action of secondary liability against head of 
state). 
 98.  See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 4(a) (2016) (allowing sovereigns to be sued 
13
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maintains a cause of action against a foreign state pursuant to the ATA’s 
general bar on suits against foreign sovereigns.
99
  The potential for claims 
under § 1605B is thus inhibited by the restrictive drafting of § 4, limiting 
aiding-and-abetting liability to private litigants.
100
  In practice, claims 
pursued under JASTA against foreign sovereigns will require a showing of 
primary liability, a high bar for holding foreign sovereigns liable and an 
ongoing hurdle for 9/11 litigants.
101
 
2.  Section Five Allows for Post Facto Executive Intervention to Stay 
JASTA Litigation, However, It Cannot Prevent Private Litigants From 
Initiating Suits 
Because JASTA is more of a political message than a coherent piece of 
legislation, the Act undermines itself by including a “Stay of Actions” that 
allows for executive intervention.
102
  Specifically, under section 5, courts 
may grant a 180-day stay if the Secretary of State certifies that the United 
States is engaged in “good faith” discussions to resolve litigant’s claim 
against the foreign state.
103
  Although the initial stay request is 
discretionary, courts must grant 180-day extension(s) upon re-certification 
by the State Department, potentially in perpetuity.
104
 
The Act gives no explicit parameters for what a court should consider 
when deciding whether or not to grant an initial stay.
105
  However, 
JASTA’s drafting implies that it is predicated on two actions that are both 
within the control of the executive: 1) the Attorney General must intervene 
to stay the action in whole or in part; and 2) the Secretary of State must 
certify that the U.S. is engaged in good faith discussions with the foreign 
state defendant.
106
  Section 5 is silent as to what outcomes a “good faith 
                                                          
on a theory of primary liability).  
 99.  See id. (maintaining the ATA’s general bar on suits against foreign sovereigns 
unless the claim can be characterized as a “JASTA” claim).  
 100.  See id. (highlighting the Act’s limitations).  
 101.  See id. (indicating that § 4 particularly hinders 9/11 litigants of 9/11 who have 
based their case on an argument of indirect material support for the 9/11 hijackers). 
 102.  See id. § 5(b) (providing for intervention by the Attorney General for staying 
the action, in whole or in part). 
 103.  See id. § 5(c)(1)-(2) (indicating a safety valve for the executive to weigh in on 
foreign policy matters).  
 104.  See id. § 5(c)(2)(B)(ii); see also Vladeck, JASTA, supra 77 (begging the 
question of whether a decision to block a stay from the executive might be deemed an 
abuse of discretion by the judiciary on issues of foreign policy, given the statutory 
protection of maintaining the stay).  
 105.  See JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222 (2016) (providing no definitional section).  
 106.  See id. § 5(b)-(c) (creating “an out” to the judiciary from deciding delicate 
foreign policy issues); see also Vladeck, 9/11 Litigation, supra note 62 (noting that 
14
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discussion” may lead to.
107
  However, a sole executive agreement that 
terminates litigation is not unlikely, particularly as the President and the 
foreign state are presumably the only parties to such a discussion.
108
  Thus, 
in practice, section 5 could partially redress executive control over sensitive 
foreign policy issues in the form of executive claim settlements, albeit only 
after a JASTA claim brings a foreign state to court.
109
 
The President’s executive claim settlement power is like section 5’s 
“good faith discussions” in that both are characterized by a privately settled 
outcome between the President and a foreign state.
110
  Interpreting section 5 
as analogous to the President’s executive claims settlement power is also 
supported by judicial precedent and executive practice.
111
  The Supreme 
Court has upheld executive claim settlement agreements in several cases, 
most famously in Dames & Moore v. Regan arising from the President’s 
use of this power during the Iranian hostage crises in 1979.
112
  In Dames & 
Moore, the Court held that the President was permitted to use his claims 
settlement power to negotiate with Iran for the return of fifty-two American 
hostages in exchange for a stay of all claims in U.S. courts seeking to 
attach Iranian property.
113
  This holding emphasizes the President’s 
suitability to balance private claims that implicate sensitive foreign policy 
issues with the interests of other nationals and the state.
114
 
Furthermore, there is analogous precedent for giving the President 
                                                          
case law in the federal circuit, such as the Terrorist Litigation Cases, shows that judges 
have thus far looked for any way possible to avoid reaching the merits of 9/11 suits).  
 107.  See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 at § 5(c) (leaving interpretation of a good 
faith discussion relatively unconstrained).  
 108.  See Ingrid Wuerth, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Initial Analysis, 
LAWFARE (Sept. 29, 2016), http://bit.ly/2fd2QAB (noting that § 5 functionally codifies 
the principle of comity statutorily providing for the judicial power to stay rather than 
allowing it as a matter of federal common law).   
 109.  See Veto Message, supra note 25 (arguing JASTA reduces the effectiveness of 
foreign policy by taking sensitive foreign policy matters away from the executive and 
national security professionals and placing them in the hands of private litigants and 
courts).  
 110.  See Wuerth, supra note 108 (suggesting § 5 is an implicit endorsement of the 
President’s claim settlement power by its very nature).  
 111.  See e.g., Dames and Moore v. Regan 453 U.S. 654, 686-91 (1981) (allowing 
for an intrusion by the executive into federal court litigation during fragile negotiations 
with Iran regarding the return of hostages).  
 112.  See id.  
 113.  See id. at 683-89 (positing that claims settlement and foreign sovereign 
immunity doctrines are complementary and have supported executive actions).  
 114.  See id. at 661-62 (arguing that good policy requires the claim of the individual 
to yield to the overriding demands of the group on some occasions).  
15
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authority to preserve immunity for foreign states in delicate foreign affairs 
through executive intervention.
115
  Within the 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), amendments to the FSIA were drafted that 
listed Iraq as a sponsor of terror.
116
  The legislation could have been 
utilized against Iraq for acts of terrorism during the Saddam Hussein 
regime.
117
  The amendment would have exposed Iraq by creating a federal 
cause of action with a possibility of punitive damages to support claims 
that previously would have been foreclosed through sovereign immunity.
118
  
Over White House and Iraqi objections, Congress passed NDAA with the 
FSIA amendments, leading President Bush to veto the legislation.
119
  After 
consultation with the executive branch, Congress re-passed NDAA but 
included a Presidential option to waive the provision with respect to 
Iraq.
120
  In doing so, Congress implicitly recognized that policies that 
implicate national security and foreign relations rightly trigger the 
executive’s powers to intervene.
121
 
As section 5 does not explicitly preclude a “good faith discussion” 
leading to an executive settlement agreement, the executive could rely on 
precedent, such as Dames & Moore and Bush’s veto of NDAA, on the 
basis that JASTA similarly imperils larger national interests.
122
  For 
example, where Dames & Moore provided for the executive to stay the 
attachment of Iranian assets on unrelated private claims suits, a similar 
rationale should be employed to indefinitely stay 9/11 litigants’ claims 
                                                          
 115.  See H.R. 1585 110th Cong. § 1083 (2007) (reiterating the continued respect 
courts have shown for the executive’s powers to settle sensitive diplomatic issues).  
 116.  See id. (undermining foreign policy and commercial interests of the United 
States in Iraq by creating a cause of action against it).   
 117.  See Press Release, Memorandum of Disapproval, President George W. Bush 
(Dec. 28, 2007), http://bit.ly/2gsejPk [hereinafter Memorandum] (citing concerns that 
the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), and commercial 
entities in the United States in which Iraq has an interest would be threatened).  
 118.  See id. (highlighting § 1083 includes provisions that “for the first time in 
history” would have exposed a foreign sovereign to punitive damages contrary to 
international legal norms and for the first time in U.S. history).   
 119.  See id. (revealing a similar executive interest to the Obama Administration’s 
interest in blocking legislation that disrupts relations between states and principles of 
sovereign immunity).  
 120.  See id. (requiring the President to determine that: (A) the waiver is in the 
national security interest of the United States; (B) will promote relations between the 
U.S. and Iraq; and (C) Iraq continues to be a reliable ally of the U.S.). 
 121.  See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(recognizing a difference in the role of government in foreign affairs and domestic 
affairs).   
 122.  See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 5 (leaving interpretation of “good faith” 
discussion open ended).  
16
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Further, the waiver option provided to Bush is analogous to how section 
5 will function in practice, allowing the executive to intervene when 
sensitive foreign policy issues are at stake.
124
  Since Congressional intent 
for executive intervention was inferred in Dames & Moore and authorized 
explicitly under remarkably similar circumstances in Bush’s waiver 
provision, precedent and practice supports an interpretation of section 5 
leading to executive claim settlement.
125
 
Finally, allowing for executive claims settlement through section 5 of 
JASTA would not disrupt the framework of diplomatic protections afforded 
under the FSIA.
126
  While the FSIA was enacted to codify immunities so 
that their application could be made dependably, it makes no reference to 
claims settlement agreements, subjecting its parameters only to existing 
international agreements, rather than future agreements.
127
  This 
construction supports a reading of section 5 that indicates executive claims 
settlement is not barred.
128
  Rather, section 5 implicitly invites an executive 
remedy that is independent from the congressionally and judicially 
fashioned remedies under JASTA.
129
 
Section 5 places the executive in the position of mitigating damage to its 
diplomatic relationships post facto rather than preemptively interceding 
cases that could have serious foreign policy implications.
130
  It is improper 
                                                          
 123.  See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684-85 (1981), (enshrining the 
historical right of the executive to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign 
governments for the purpose of keeping peace with those governments).  
 124.  See JASTA § 5(c) (providing for executive intervention and stay of litigation 
that is functionally analogous to Presidential intervention in the form of claims 
settlement).  
 125.  See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654; see also Memorandum, supra note 117 
(registering successfully the executive’s concerns over how NADAA would disrupt 
relations with not only Iraq, but also the international community, and a grant for 
executive waiver).  
 126.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1992) (clarifying that the FSIA is subject to 
international agreements).  
 127.  See id. (subjecting the FSIA framework to “existing international agreements” 
to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment). 
 128.  See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 4(a), 130 Stat. 852, 854 (2016) (recalling 
that JASTA amends the FSIA and should thus now be considered part of its 
framework).  
 129.  See Wuerth, supra note 108 (tracing the likelihood of “discussions” leading to 
an agreement that could easily call for the termination of litigation).  
 130.  See id. (begging the question of how “good faith” discussions would happen in 
practice when diplomatic norms have been violated).  
17
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that, under JASTA, it is sufficient to plead terrorism to haul a sovereign 
state into court, whatever the merits or foreign policy ramifications.
131
  
However, while section 5 offers a degree of executive intervention, it does 




3.  Recovery Under JASTA Is Remote Because the FSIA Affords Broader 
Immunity to Foreign-State-Owned Assets and the Executive Rightfully Has 
Waiver Powers. 
Tension between the theories of absolute and restrictive immunity is at 
its highest within the FSIA’s treatment of foreign assets.
133
  Special 
protection for foreign assets held within the United States was codified 
within the FSIA because “the international community viewed execution 
against a foreign state’s property as a greater affront to its sovereignty than 
merely permitting jurisdiction over the merits of an action.”
134
  At the time 
of the FSIA’s enactment, Congress accepted the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity as an accepted practice of international law.
135
  
However, the enforcement of judgments against foreign states remained a 
controversial subject that courts, as well as policymakers, were hesitant to 
allow without due consideration.
136
  This concern is reflected in the 
additional analysis required under the FSIA for immunity from pre-
judgment attachment of assets and post-judgment execution.
137
 
Under the FSIA, the property of a foreign state in the United States is 
presumptively immune so even if jurisdiction is established over a foreign 
state, a resulting judgment is not necessarily enforceable.
138
  This reflects 
                                                          
 131.  See Veto Message, supra note 25 (noting JASTA permits litigation against 
states that have neither been designated by the executive branch as state sponsors of 
terrorism, nor taken direct action against the United States).  
 132.  See JASTA § 5(b) (emphasizing intervention happens after a foreign state is 
made subject to the jurisdiction of a court of the United States).  
 133.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-11 (1976) (providing narrower exceptions to immunity 
for attachments and execution than for jurisdiction).  
 134.  See Walters v. Indus. & Commer. Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (quoting Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 
255-56 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that judicial seizure of a foreign state’s property may be 
regarded as an affront to its dignity and may affect U.S. relations with it).  
 135.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976) (providing that acts of state should be 
distinguished from commercial acts).  
 136.  See Walters, 651 F.3d 280 at 289 (tracing the reasoning of the FSIA’s broader 
protections to sovereign property than sovereigns themselves).  
 137.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-11 (observing that the asymmetry between jurisdiction 
and execution immunity in the FSIA reflects a deliberate congressional choice).  
 138.  See id. (setting forth the limited exceptions to the attachment of assets that are 
18
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Under section 1609 of the FSIA, even when a court enters a valid 
judgment, the property of a foreign state is subject only to attachment and 
execution as specifically provided in sections 1610 and 1611.
140
  Certain 
types of property such as embassies, consulates, and their bank accounts, 
are generally protected under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic 
Relations and Consular Relations.
141  Further, under section 1610(c), the 
FSIA prevents attachment or execution against foreign states until the court 
determines a reasonable period of time has elapsed following an entry of 
judgment against a foreign state.
142  This affords a foreign state time to 
react to the judgment and for the courts to exercise discretion in how a 
judgment will be collected or waived at the behest of the executive.
143
 
In sum, the execution of judgments under the FSIA is in practice more 
aligned with absolute immunity.
144
  This has not gone unnoticed by the 
Court, which observed that “the asymmetry between jurisdiction and 
execution” of attaching assets under the FSIA reflects a “deliberate 
congressional choice” to create a “right without a remedy” in 




However, in the last twenty years Congress has pushed back on the 
FSIA’s presumption of immunity for sovereign assets on several occasions 
reflecting less favor for soft power diplomacy tactics of the 20th-century.
146
  
                                                          
narrower for assets than for sovereigns themselves).  
 139.  See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(shifting the burden to plaintiffs to establish an exception to immunity).  
 140.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610-11 (stating that the property of a foreign state is never 
automatically subject to attachment or execution based on the underlying judgment).   
 141.  See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 22, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95 (providing that the property of the mission be immune from search, 
requisition, attachment, or execution).  
 142.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (starting the “reasonable period of time” after notice 
has been given to the foreign state).  
 143.  See, e.g., Pravin Banker Assocs. Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 
853 (2d Cir. 1997) (granting two stays before granting summary judgment).  
 144.  See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (defining the 
notion of sovereign immunity as consonant with the usages and accepted obligations of 
the civilized world).  
 145.  See Walters v. Indus. & Commer. Bank of China Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (holding the “right without a remedy” is a reflection of Congress’s view of 
sovereignty expressed in the United Nations Charter that left the availability of 
execution up to the debtor state).  
 146.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(3) (2003) (attempting to remove immunities 
19
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These efforts have been repeatedly curtailed by the executive, tasked with 
protecting the interests of the United States, and maintaining national 
security, which hinges on harmonious relations with foreign states.
147
  
Legislation like the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) reflects 
Congress’s efforts to scale back the protections afforded to foreign assets 
under the FSIA.
148
  TRIA creates a cause of action that uses assets from a 
foreign state to satisfy a successful judgment against it for damages arising 
from an act of terrorism.
149
  It also statutorily prohibits the President from 
categorically barring foreign assets for attachment through Presidential 
waiver, and requires him to make an “asset-by-asset” determination.
150
  
Like the ATA, the TRIA is designed in part to provide economic deterrence 
to foreign states that sponsor terrorist attacks.
151
  It does this by using 
foreign assets to cover the costs of insurance the act provides.
152
  The 
deterrence effect is questionable, as only certain assets are immune from 
waiver.
153
  Moreover, most foreign states’ assets are covered by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, allowing the President to block attachment if foreign 
policy goals so dictate.
154
 
Whether assets can be attached or not creates an imbalance issue with 
the TRIA and the FSIA in general; some plaintiffs will be able to collect 
while similarly situated plaintiffs will not.
155
  Further, attempts by Congress 
                                                          
afforded to foreign state assets). 
 147.  See Memorandum, supra note 117 (reflecting the Bush Administration’s 
concerns about penalizing Iraq financially as the state was being rebuilt and relations 
were normalizing with the United States).  
 148.  See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), Pub. L. 107–297, 116 Stat. 2322 
(2002) (providing for the attachment of assets in order to satisfy judgments to the 
extent of damages a terrorist party has been adjudged liable). 
 149.  See id. § 201(a) (providing a means for litigants to seek damages from a 
foreign state notwithstanding the immunities afforded to the attachment of assets under 
FSIA).   
 150.  See id. § 201(b) (preserving a waiver for national security reasons, but making 
it harder for the president to utilize the waiver).  
 151.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1992) (providing civil remedies in treble as well as 
attorney’s fees to successful plaintiffs).  
 152.  See TRIA § 107 (attempting to satisfy judgments for tortious claims arising out 
of terrorism by the liable state’s assets).  
 153.  See id. at § 201(b)(1) (allowing the President to waive the required attachment 
of assets against any property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic or 
Consular Relations).  
 154.  See id. (recalling that the Vienna Convention is a pre-existing treaty obligation, 
breach of which would most certainly be seen as a violation of international law).  
 155.  See Jeewon Kim, Making State Sponsors of Terrorism Pay: A Separation of 
Powers Discourse Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
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to chip away at the FSIA’s protection of foreign assets does not consider 
that foreign assets held in the U.S. are finite.
156
  At the time of TRIA’s 
passage, Iran, the most commonly sued state, had only had $251.9 million 
in frozen assets, which is an insufficient amount to cover compensatory 
damages for existing judgments.
157
 
Foreign states are not ignorant of how the United States proposes to 
satisfy judgments.
158
  For instance, Saudi Arabia has made statements that 
it would remove its assets if Congress passed JASTA.
159
  Therefore, when 
plaintiffs succeed in securing judgments, it is probable that not all will 
receive payment.
160
  This creates inequities in how similarly situated 




Increasing the number of litigants dependent on finite attachable foreign 
assets to satisfy their judgment also undermines the basic tenant of 
remedy.
162
  Plaintiffs initiate litigation in the hope that a court will find in 
their favor and will award them damages or reparations.
163
  However, the 
                                                          
L. 513, 523 (2004) (positing that the FSIA and amendments like TRIA are flawed 
because they frustrate victims and pits the executive against plaintiffs).  
 156.  See id. at 524 (noting if plaintiffs are successful, the blocked assets of foreign 
states will eventually run out).  
 157.  See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 
(D.D.C. 2009) (noting the amount of Iranian assets within the United States is 
approximately $45 million, while outstanding judgments against Iran stand at $10 
billion dollars).  
 158.  See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(noting that Syria feared that successful plaintiffs who had won judgments in federal 
court would seek to attach ancient artifacts belonging to Syria on loan to the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art).  
 159.  See Mark Mazzetti, Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress 
Passes 9/11 Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-warns-
ofeconomic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9-11-bill.html (reporting Saudi Arabia warned 
the Obama Administration it will sell off billions of dollars-worth of American assets 
held by the kingdom).  
 160.  See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 58 
(holding that expanding exceptions to immunity means that liability in the form of 
billions of dollars will quickly become insurmountable for defendant states).  
 161.  See Kim, supra note 155, at 524 (noting that the Deputy Secretary of the 
Department of the Treasury testified that the TRIA creates “gross inequities” for 
plaintiffs).  
 162.  See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(noting early on that the FSIA complicates our legal system by allowing plaintiffs to 
seek remedies that are necessarily barred for important foreign policy reasons).  
 163.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring that factual contentions by the plaintiff have 
evidentiary support and are based on a reasonable belief, generally barring suits that 
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prospects for recovery in FSIA cases are extremely remote and unequally 
granted when assets can be attached.
164
  JASTA ignores this reality and 
grows the pool of litigants trying to track down attachable assets by making 
it easier to bring suit under the FSIA.
165
  As JASTA does not recognize any 
of these hurdles, the legislation will not achieve its stated purpose of 
benefitting victims of terrorism.
166
  Further, it will exacerbate long-
recognized policy problems of allowing litigants to seek reparations from 
foreign states at all.
167
 
B.  JASTA Dangerously Disrupts the Principle of Sovereign Immunity and 
The Separation of Power Doctrine by Limiting the Executive’s Control 
Over Foreign Policy. 
JASTA problematically disrupts the separation of powers.
168
  Fighting 
terrorism and the exercise of diplomatic relations are traditionally within 
the purview of the executive branch, although Congress plays a supportive 
role.
169
  However, rather than wait for the executive and Congress to 
determine which states merit listing as state sponsors of terrorism, JASTA 
allows private litigants to leapfrog the political branches by alleging a 
foreign state is responsible for a terrorist act.
170
  This opens the door for 
litigants, whose interests do not necessarily match those of our nation as a 
whole, to bring foreign states into court.
171
  Once a suit is initiated, the 
                                                          
lack basis).  
 164.  See Kim, supra note 155, at 524 (noting the FSIA mostly frustrates victims and 
adding further exceptions to immunities only exacerbates the problem). 
 165.  See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2(b) (seeking to give civil litigants “the 
broadest possible basis” to seek relief against foreign states). 
 166.  See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 67 (noting JASTA does not deal with 
the broader immunities pertaining to the attachment of assets).  
 167.  See id. at 67-68 (arguing litigation under the FSIA is not sustainable).  
 168.  See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 
(D.D.C. 2009) (holding civil actions against foreign states confront “fundamental 
understandings” of foreign state sovereignty and conflict with the exercise of 
presidential power in the realm of foreign affairs). 
 169.  See U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2. (making the President “Commander in Chief” and 
delegating the President power to “make Treaties,” to “appoint Ambassadors, and to 
“receive Ambassadors and other public ministers”).  
 170.  See Veto Message, supra note 25 (critiquing how JASTA permit litigation 
against countries that have neither been designated by the executive branch as state 
sponsors of terrorism nor taken direct actions in the United States).   
 171.  Compare FSIA § 1605A(a)(1) (2008) (barring immunity for claims against 
states designated as FTOs by the State Department for specified acts of terrorism), with 
JASTA § 3(a) (2016) (allowing for claims “regardless of where the tortious act of the 
foreign state occurred” and regardless of their FTO status).  
22
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executive loses control over the process and leaves these careful 
determinations in the hands of private citizens and district courts.
172
  
Removing these determinations from the executive does not advance the 
cause of identifying state sponsors of terrorism, and it further interferes 
with the executive’s foreign policy efforts.
173
 
The executive has an interest in keeping foreign states out of courts for a 
number of reasons.
174
  Despite the fact that judges must hear evidence 
before entering judgment, the implied unfairness of these proceedings is 
questionable, particularly as foreign defendants rarely appear to defend 
themselves.
175
  Although the jurisprudence of the courts has thus far limited 
modes of liability in keeping with the FSIA’s presumption of immunity, 
courts run the risk of undermining their impartiality to satisfy the public’s 
demand for justice to victims of terrorism.
176
 
Keeping foreign states out of court is also in the interest of the executive 
because liquidating the assets of foreign states disrupts diplomatic relations 
and lessens political leverage.
177
  Preventing such disruption and instability 
has been a concern of the executive branch, particularly with “rogue 
states.”
178
  As President Clinton explained when he utilized his presidential 
waiver to bar attachment of Iranian assets, the executive’s control over 
foreign assets is a necessary component of a flexible and responsive foreign 
policy.
179
  Further, when a foreign state is unable to pay billions it owes due 
                                                          
 172.  See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 63 (testifying JASTA strips the 
executive branch of the authority given to it by Congress to identify threats to the 
U.S.).  
 173.  See id. (stating this shift of power gravely compromises U.S. security 
interests).   
 174.  See generally Part B (interpreting JASTA’s impact on the separation of powers 
as a detriment of national security).  
 175.  But see Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 754 
(2d Cir. 1998); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(entering judgments against Libya and Iraq in rare exception to the usual default 
judgment).   
 176.  See Kim, supra note 155, at 526 (arguing that the nature of terrorism suits runs 
the risk of politicizing Judges against “pariah states”).  
 177.  See Walters v. Indus. & Commerce Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (highlighting the view that great seizure of a state’s property may undermine 
relations).  
 178.  See Kim, supra note 155 at 526 (writing the Clinton Administration 
“strenuously” objected to TRIA’s aim of letting plaintiff’s attach foreign assets to 
satisfy judgments).  
 179.  See id. at 527 (noting Congress recognized the importance of leveraging frozen 
assets when it created the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 
1701-06 (2003) and Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-6, 7-39, 41-44 
(2003), and noting that Carter’s ability to freeze $12 billion of Iranian assets during the 
23
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to terrorism suits, this prevents relations from thawing, whether or not this 
is in the interest of the state.
180
  JASTA undermines and exacerbates these 




The passage of JASTA illustrates a Congressional shift away from the 
executive branch’s long-recognized powers in the sphere of foreign 
affairs.
182
  When compared to the interplay between the two branches in 
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, arising from the Bush Administration’s pushback 
against the NDAA, JASTA reveals a significant step into the domain of the 
executive.
183
  In Beaty, the Court was asked to resolve conflict between 
congressional intent to create victim-friendly legislation and executive 
obligations to a foreign state.
184
  Congress’s initial attempt to amend the 
FSIA’s terrorism exception directly conflicted with President Bush’s 
foreign policy goals in Iraq.
185
  The proposed amendment would have 
applied to current and past designated state sponsors of terrorism, 
potentially opening Iraq to suit, although it had been delisted.
186
  When 
Congress failed to include a presidential waiver provision, which would 
allow President Bush to waive the bill’s applicability to Iraq, he vetoed the 
bill.
187
  Ultimately, the bill was redrafted to include a provision satisfying 
                                                          
Iranian hostage crises hinged on his ability to leverage these assets).  
 180.  See id. at 526-27 (arguing that this is the central policy concern of the 
executive because it reduced the likelihood of using diplomatic channels in the future 
to resolve disputes).  
 181.  See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2(a)(1), (7) (positing that the Act reflects 
the U.S.’s “vital interest” in providing individuals “full access” to the court system, in 
contrast to the executive’s concerns articulated in the Presidential Veto).   
 182.  See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 63 (testifying that JASTA strips the 
executive branch of its proper authority to address terrorism, which is mostly effected 
by external relations).   
 183.  See Memorandum, supra note 117 (vetoing the NDAA on the basis that it 
disrupts relations between states and principles of sovereign immunity). See generally 
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 851 (2009). 
 184.  See generally Republic of Iraq, 556 U.S. at 851 (providing President Bush to 
exercise his authority to the fullest extent to declare Iraq “inapplicable” to the FSIA § 
620A so that it could be rebuilt).  
 185.  See Memorandum, supra note 117 (stating to subject Iraq to litigation in U.S. 
courts or hold it liable for terrorist acts would undermine improving relations and 
stabilization of the region).  
 186.  See Republic of Iraq, 556 U.S. at 863 (noting that to prevent the President from 
using his waiver authority would imperil billions of dollars of Iraqi assets). 
 187.  See id. at 854 (citing Bush’s Memorandum to the House of Representatives 
Returning Without Approval the NDAA, unless the law recognized all provisions “with 
respect to Iraq”). 
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President Bush’s demands.
188
   
Although the Supreme Court conceded that it could not say with 
certainty whether President Bush was correct in his view that exposing Iraq 
to damages would jeopardize the reconstruction of the state, it noted courts 
should be “wary of overriding apparent statutory text supported by 
executive interpretation in favor of speculation about a law’s true purpose” 
that falls within the “complicated” and “delicate” realm of foreign 
affairs.
189
  This determination emphasizes the judiciary and congressional 
acquiescence to granting the President the power to suspend the operation 
of a valid law in the sphere of foreign affairs.
190
  The Court found “the 
granting of Presidential waiver authority . . . particularly apt with respect to 
congressional elimination of foreign sovereign immunity, since the 
granting or denial of that immunity was historically the case-by-case 
prerogative of the Executive Branch.”
191
  Although this left some victims 
unable to proceed with suit against Iraq, larger policy interests articulated 
by the executive to stabilize Iraq were favored.
192
 
The Court’s holding in Beaty emphasizes the practical and functional 
rationales for affording the executive branch greater leeway in the 
maintenance of diplomatic relations for the benefit of national security.
193  
Scholars have argued that, in the realm of foreign affairs, the executive 
possesses extraconstitutional powers against the backdrop of national 
security considerations.
194
  The executive is directly afforded power 
through Article II section 2 of the Constitution to “make Treaties,” 
“appoint Ambassadors,” and to “receive Ambassadors and other public 
                                                          
 188.  See Memorandum, supra note 117 (conditioning his acceptance of the NDAA 
on inclusion of the waiver).  
 189.  See Republic of Iraq, 556 U.S. at 860 (noting that the executive’s powers to 
implement sovereign immunities is based on political realities and relationships).   
 190.  See id. at 856 (noting that while “to a layperson” the notion of the President’s 
suspension of valid law “may seem strange,” the practice is “well-established, at least 
in the sphere of foreign affairs”).  
 191.  See id. at 857 (citing to Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-590 (1943)).  
 192.  See id. at 863 (holding it would be “perplexing” to convert Iraq’s billion-dollar 
reconstruction project “into a compensation scheme” for a limited group of victims).  
 193.  See id. at 858 (noting that the Court canvassed precedents from as early as the 
“inception of the national government” in support of the executive’s powers to suspend 
operation of law in the sphere of foreign affairs).  
 194.  See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1935) 
(asserting in Justice Sutherland’s dicta that the “powers of external sovereignty did not 
depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution,” but rather are “vested in the 
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality” and locating those 
powers in the president).   
25
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ministers.”
195
  These reflect the President’s domestic powers to create 
international obligations for the United States in his capacity as the nation’s 
“constitutional representative” in foreign affairs.
196
 
The Court has also highlighted the executive’s superior position with 
respect to fact gathering as a compelling reason for granting the President 





addition to constitutional arguments, there are pragmatic factors that tip the 
balance of foreign-relations control in the executive’s favor.
198
 A 
combination of these observations supports the argument that, because the 
Constitution does not articulate which political branch is directly 
responsible for shaping and executing U.S. foreign policy, the executive 
branch should be allowed to exercise de facto primary control in the arena 
of foreign affairs.
199
  This comports with historical precedent: when 
determining whether a foreign state could assert the defense of sovereign 
immunity in a U.S. court, the historic judicial practice had been to defer to 
the executive’s recommendations.200
 
The Supreme Court has long held that the President has plenary and 
exclusive authority over the conduct of foreign affairs.
201 
 This does not 
mean that the executive is the “sole organ” in the realm of external 
relations; but rather, that the branch holds significant responsibility for the 
“conduct of foreign relations” and is shown necessary deference over 
matters concerning national security.
202 
 Indeed, the President’s “sole 
                                                          
 195.  See U.S. CONST. art. II § 3 (providing as well the power to “take care the 
“Laws be faithfully executed”).  
 196.  See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (suggesting this characterization of the 
president is a functional extension of the duties afforded to the office through the 
Constitution).  
 197.  See id. at 320 (holding the President, not Congress, has the better opportunity 
of knowing the conditions that prevail in foreign countries).  
 198.  See id. (noting the nature of foreign policy often requires immediate responses 
that could not reasonably be expected from a congressional body for all diplomatic 
interactions).  
 199.  See id. (suggesting that the maintenance of our external relations is dependent 
on providing the executive with a degree of discretion because sensitive information of 
state cannot always reasonably be shared with Congress).   
 200.  See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(articulating that determinations of immunity were traditionally made by the 
executive). 
 201.  See e.g. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1948); see also Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U.S. at 317 (reminding that “though the states were several people in 
respect of foreign affairs were one”).  
 202.  See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (recognizing this power as not arising 
from an act of Congress).   
26
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organ” powers were put into check in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company 
v. Sawyer, particularly because the President’s attempt to seize domestic 
steel mills without Congressional approval had an internal effect.
203
 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation emphasizes the 
distinction between the application of executive powers between internal 
and external affairs.
204  
In Curtiss-Wright, the Court suggests that the 
corners of limiting executive powers externally were not as explicit when 
assigning foreign policy powers because external powers do not infringe on 
the rights of states.
205  
Even if the Constitution enumerated the executive’s 
foreign affairs’ powers, the executive would still have inherited powers 
beyond the Congress or Judiciary through the Executive’s ability to shape 





found it “apparent” that when embarrassment in the maintenance of our 
international relations is to be avoided and success for our nations’ aims 
achieved, congressional legislation within the international sphere should 
accord the President “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory 
restriction” that would not be appropriate within the domestic realm.
207
 
In contrast, JASTA interferes with the executive’s ability to afford 
certain states immunity where policy dictates for national security 
reasons.
208
  Whether JASTA is able to curtail sovereign immunity or not, 
its bid to diminish immunity is clear.
209
  It attempts to move U.S. policy 
further away from a presumption of immunity, as it amends the FSIA and 
purports to amend the ATA.
210
  Comity and mutual respect for sovereignty 
                                                          
 203.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 684-85 (1952). 
But see id. at 668 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting on the basis that the external 
exigencies of the Korean War justified the President’s actions for national security 
reasons).  
 204.  See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315-16 (holding that the idea of the executive 
being constrained by her enumerated rights is only true in the context of internal 
affairs).  
 205.  See id. at 316 (noting states never had foreign relation powers thus the foreign 
affairs power of the executive emanates from another source).  
 206.  See id. at 316, 318 (writing that as a result of the colonies separation from 
Great Britain, the power over external relations passed to the United States as a single 
organ).  
 207.  See id. at 320 (highlighting particularly how JASTA fractures the executive’s 
ability to control U.S. policy towards foreign states because any plaintiff can bring a 
suit against any nation).  
 208.  See Memorandum, supra note 117 (arguing that to constrict the executive from 
exercising a waiver of immunity would imperil stabilization of Iraq and undermine 
national security efforts aimed at the region).  
 209.  See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2(b) (providing the “broadest” possible 
basis for litigants to seek relief against foreign states).  
 210.  See id. (purporting to scale back the protections afforded to foreign states but 
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operates both ways.
211
  JASTA erodes this protection and departs from 
longstanding standards of practice codified in the FSIA.
212
  It also threatens 
to strip all foreign governments of immunity from judicial process based on 
private litigant’s allegations, rather than executive determination.
213
  
Instead of speaking with one unified voice, this invites the possibility that 
different courts could reach varying conclusions about the culpability of 
individual foreign governments and their role in terrorist activities directed 
against the United States.
214
  Thus, JASTA promotes discordant policy in 
the realm of foreign affairs and conflicts with the executive’s ability to 
control its relations with foreign states.
215
 
Additionally, by upsetting longstanding international principles of 
sovereign immunity, JASTA jeopardizes the executive’s long-held powers 
over national security by putting foreign nationals, the military, and 
diplomatic officers of the state at risk.
216
  JASTA erodes the principle of 
sovereign immunity, which makes the United States vulnerable to 
reciprocal actions from foreign states.
217
  Moreover, the United States has 
the most to lose through reciprocal actions because it holds more property 
abroad than any other nation.
218 
                                                          
in practice falls short of many of its aims).  
 211.  See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812) (characterizing the 
notion of sovereign immunity as consonant with the accepted obligations of the 
civilized world).  
 212.  Compare JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2(b) (enlarging the means to bring 
suit against a sovereign foreign state), with Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 137 (holding 
that the principle of sovereign immunity is integral to successful relations between 
states).  
 213.  See Veto Message, supra note 25 (arguing that JASTA upsets longstanding 
international principles regarding sovereign immunity that can globally change how 
states mutually recognize sovereignty and have serious implications for U.S. national 
interests).  
 214.  Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 
(1935) (articulating that the states speak through the voice of the executive to avoid 
embarrassment), with JASTA, § 2(b) (providing litigants a way to circumvent the 
vetting process of the executive).  
 215.  See Veto Message, supra note 25 (noting that evaluations of state sponsors of 
terrorism are only made by careful security, policy, and intelligence considerations are 
made because of the external repercussions of these decisions).  
 216.  See id. (stating that JASTA encourages foreign governments to reciprocally 
allow their domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States where the 
U.S. previously enjoyed immunity through customary international law).  
 217.  See id. (noting reciprocal actions could implicate the safety of military abroad 
for allegedly causing injuries overseas through U.S. support for third-parties, such as 
Saudi Arabia in Yemen or the Kurds in Syria).  
 218.  See id. (reminding Congress that any successful judgments would be fulfilled 
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Unlike the current terrorism exception in U.S. law, JASTA does not limit 
litigation to cases where our government has determined that retaliation for 
terrorist support is justified.
219
  JASTA undercuts the United States’ ability 
to argue that the terrorism exception is a legitimate countermeasure 
permitted by international law.
220
  Instead, it allows private parties to force 
a foreign sovereign into court, disrupting the executive’s recognized 
control over foreign policy and national security issues.
221 
IV.  POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
JASTA should be repealed because it represents the worst of all worlds; 
it exacerbates issues of terrorism by isolating the United States from its 
allies in the fight against terror, and reduces comity between states overall.  
Moreover, it harkens back to the reactionary policies post 9/11 that 
triggered a period of “American exceptionalism” that significantly affected 
international law.
222
  In particular, President Bush’s “war on terror” 
promoted a flexible take on jus cogens norms and justified exceptions to 
the rule of law as necessary to combat terrorism.
223
  Pundits may debate the 
effectiveness of this approach but there is no doubt that it had significant 
costs on the international reputation of the United States.
224
  JASTA 
similarly pursues policies that are in contravention to international norms, 
and undermines the United States’ credibility as a law abiding country.
225
 
The legality of the Bush and Obama Administration’s policies in 
response to terrorism were questioned by both our allies as well as our 
adversaries.
226
  JASTA reiterates these concerns and suggests that the 
                                                          
by seizing U.S. assets abroad).  
 219.  See id. (stating these are delicate political evaluations).  
 220.  See id. (undermining existing national security policy and implicating 
questions of legality under international law).  
 221.  See Veto Message, supra note 25 (emphasizing the Obama Administration’s 
necessary veto of JASTA).  
 222.  See Christopher J. Borgen, Hearts and Minds and Laws: Legal Compliance 
and Diplomatic Persuasion, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 769 (2008-2009) (attributing the 
term to William Kristol, a neoconservative who advocated rejected rigid legalism when 
addressing conflict areas in the world).   
 223.  See Nagle, supra note 24 (reporting on Dutch and Iraqi outcries against 
JASTA because it breaches international norms of sovereignty).  
 224.  See Martin Kettle et al., What impact did 9/11 have on America?, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 6, 2011), http://bit.ly/2fNFsbd (reflecting on policies following 9/11 that were 
viewed as unjustifiable by the international community).  
 225.  See id. (arguing that the Bush Administration’s policy eroded fundamental 
protections in the American and international legal landscape).  
 226.  See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 65 (noting that actions viewed as 
illegal by other states also subject the US to reciprocal actions under JASTA).  
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United States is indifferent to longstanding principles of international 
law.
227
  The United States’ indifference to international law, real or 
imagined, has several counteractive effects on security.  First, it undercuts 
our legitimacy in the “fight in terror” and sows mistrust.
228
  Second, 
JASTA’s disregard for international law encourages other states to do the 
same, thereby shrinking comity between states worldwide.
229
  Third, 
although terrorism has required the United States and other states to 
reevaluate longstanding conceptions of what war and combat means, one 
lesson has remained constant: the insidious nature of terrorism means that 




Collaboration between states is dependent on international law – “the 
language and grammar of international relations.”
231
  Thus, while policies 
of American exceptionalism have downplayed the importance of 
international norms in matters of national security and war, these 
constraints matter most internationally.
232
  Repealing JASTA will indicate 




If the United States is going to engage collaboratively with other states it 
must use reasonable polices that fit within a wider context of shared 
understandings about the rule of law and international norms.
234
  Typically 
this is referred to as “soft power,” or the ability to influence other states 
                                                          
 227.  See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812) (holding that to 
haul a sovereign nation to a domestic court is an affront to its sovereignty and 
undermines relations between states).   
 228.  See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 70 (arguing that to let private litigants 
accuse sovereign states of terrorism as a matter of first instance discredits 
counterterrorism policies).   
 229.  See id. (arguing that JASTA erodes customary practice of international law in 
regards to sovereign immunity).  
 230.  See Borgen, supra note 222, at 774 (suggesting that to combat terrorism states 
must “out-cooperate”).  
 231.  See id. at 770 (noting that law structures the relations among states by using a 
common frame of reference).   
 232.  See id. at 770-71 (arguing international law is the common vernacular between 
states, thus when it is ignored it leads to diplomatic isolation).  
 233.  See Sheikh Jamal Al-Dhari, With Saudi-9/11 Bill, Iraqis Will Force US to 
Answer For 2003 Invasion, THE HILL (Oct. 25, 2016), http://tinyurl.com/jx2xd9g 
(noting that JASTA has led to the creation of Justice Against American Actions 
(JAAA), a group of international lawyers organizing against American unilateralism).  
 234.  See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN 
WORLD POLITICS (2004) (noting that dominant states cannot simply impose their will 
on others, but must persuade through soft power means of persuasion).   
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through non-military means.
235 
 A key aspect of soft power is a state’s 
reputation and compliance with rule of law and international norms.
236
  In 
other words, soft power is enhanced by adhering to international law.
237
 
Given the transnational nature of terrorism, the United States cannot 
expect to prevent terrorist attacks without the collaboration of other 
states.
238
  Policies such as JASTA that undermine customary law and 
custom do not go unnoticed, nor do they encourage collaboration.
239
  As 
writer and foreign affairs journalist Fareed Zakaria discussed shortly before 
the United States began the Iraq War: “America is virtually alone. Never 
will it have waged a war in such isolation. Never have so many of its allies 
been so firmly opposed to its policies False In fact, the debate is not about 
Saddam anymore. It is about America and its role in the new world . . . .”
240
  
JASTA is policy that isolates the United States in the eyes of the world and 
promotes a return of military might versus military right.
241
  This kind of 
legislation is untenable for combating terrorism and should be repealed. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
JASTA will not achieve its stated aim of holding foreign states 
accountable for materially supporting terrorism because it creates potent 
and unjustifiable risks.
242
  First, it allows private litigants to bring sovereign 
states into U.S. courts against the long-established principles of sovereign 
                                                          
 235.  See id. at 18-21 (advocating soft power diplomacy as an alternative to military 
force to influence foreign states).  
 236.  See Borgen, supra note 222, at 775 (arguing soft power creates pull that 
attracts other states to collaborate and eases cooperation). 
 237.  See id. (citing Harold Honju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1479, 1480 (2003) which argues that when the US obeys international norms it 
enhances its moral authority).  
 238.  See generally Crocker Snow, Jr., The Privatization of U.S. Public Diplomacy, 
32 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 189, 192 (2008) (noting the “with us or against us” 
policies for combatting terrorism were not successful).  
 239.  See Al-Dhari, supra note 233 (suggesting that Congress was not aware how 
JASTA would affect its credibility).  
 240.  See Borgen supra note 222, at 776 (quoting Fareed Zakaria, The Arrogant 
Empire, NEWSWEEK, at 18, 20-23 (Mar. 24, 2003)).  
 241.  See Snow, supra note 238, at 192 (arguing that taking unilateralist positions on 
key matters of war and peace are widely viewed as hypocritical to U.S. ideals).  
 242.  See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 67 (noting JASTA only deals with 
amenability to suit rather than immunities for attachment of assets that could satisfy a 
successful judgment); see also Vladeck, JASTA, supra note 77 (positing that JASTA is 
the worst of all worlds by presenting victims of terrorism with legislation that is legally 
weak, while eroding the principle of sovereign immunity and relations with Saudi 
Arabia).  
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immunity.
243
  This allows private citizens to circumvent the political 
branches if they believe they were harmed by a foreign state, stripping the 
executive of its power to effectively govern foreign relations and protect 
American interests.
244
  Secondly, JASTA opens the door for reciprocal 




In addition, JASTA’s drafting denudes much of what it purports to do.
246
  
It fails to overturn prior judicial decisions relating to 9/11 litigation, 
providing no new remedy for these victims as it claims.
247
  Further, it 
provides for an executive stay of action that can stall litigation.
248
  Finally, 
it fails to address the attachment of assets to successful judgments, the 
greatest hurdle for litigants seeking reparations from a foreign state.
249
  
Rather than help victims of terrorism as it purports, JASTA erodes 
protections for citizens as a whole, and interferes with the executive’s 
policies of combating terrorism by violating international law and 
damaging relations between states. 
 
                                                          
 243.  See generally Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 146 (1812) 
(establishing the principle of sovereign immunity in U.S. jurisprudence). 
 244.  See id. (concluding that the has the authority to thwart domestic litigation 
when the needs of foreign policy are pressing).  
 245.  See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 64 (testifying that only the 
international practice of recognizing sovereign immunity protects the United States 
from financial risk through suit and distracting harassment); Veto Message, supra note 
25 (remarking enactment of JASTA encourages foreign governments to allow their 
domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. officials and military for allegedly 
causing injuries overseas). 
 246.  See Vladeck, JASTA, supra note 77 (comparing JASTA as it was proposed and 
its force as enacted).  
 247.  See JASTA Pub. L. No. 114-222 § 2 (claiming but not providing for plaintiffs 
to seek relief against persons, entities, and foreign states “wherever they may be 
found”).  
 248.  See id. at § 5 (opening the door for the executive to use its claims settlement 
power or stay litigation indefinitely).  
 249.  See Stephan Statement, supra note 78, at 68 (concluding that civil actions 
against foreign states frustrate victims because they are rarely paid while 
simultaneously causing conflict with foreign states).  
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